Abstract: The analysis of presupposition projection lead researchers to posit in the early 1980's that the meaning of a clause should be viewed as its Context Change Potential rather than as its truth conditions (Heim 1983 , following Stalnaker 1974. We argue that this 'dynamic turn' was misguided, and that it leads straight into a dilemma: either one follows Stalnaker in his pragmatic analysis, in which case one obtains a beautiful analysis of presupposition projection in conjunctions, but not of much else; or one follows Heim in her semantic analysis, which yields broader empirical coverage but little explanatory depth (no predictions are made about connectives whose Context Change Potential was not stipulated to begin with). We sketch an alternative account, entirely developed within classical logic. We argue that in some cases a complex meaning m is conceptualized as involving a precondition p, with m=pp' (Division) In this case a pragmatic principle, Be Articulate!, requires that if possible m should be expressed as a conjunction p and pp' rather than as pp' (in order to make explicit the special status of the pre-condition p). If so, why can pp' ever be pronounced on its own? Because a principle of Minimization sometimes rules out the full conjunction p and pp', leaving pp' as the sole contender. Specifically, Minimization prohibits any sentence S from starting with α[p and if it can be ascertained that no matter how S will end the string p and could be deleted from S without modifying its contextual meaning. This derives a principle of Transparency, which suffices to obtain Heim's projection results, but which has the advantage of making predictions for connectives that she does not consider. We end the paper with some speculations on the Principle of Division, and suggest (but do not show) that it is itself pragmatic in nature.
The Dynamic Turn and the Transparency Theory

The Dynamic Turn and an Alternative
A new conception of meaning arose in the early 1980's, thanks in large part to the works of R. Stalnaker and I. Heim. It used to be thought that the meaning of a clause could, as a first approximation, be analyzed as its truth conditions. Building on ideas by Stalnaker, Heim suggested instead that one should view the meaning of a clause in a dynamic way, as the effect it has on the Context Set, i.e. on the beliefs of the speech act participants (these beliefs are henceforth modeled as a the set of those possible worlds that are compatible with what the speaker and addressee take for granted). An important part of the motivation for this 'dynamic turn' lay in the analysis of the 'Projection Problem' for presuppositions 2 . To 2 Another part of the motivation had to do with the analysis of donkey anaphora, a problem that we do not consider in this paper (but see Heim 1982 , Kamp 1981 , Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991 . Suffice it to say that the arguments in favor of a dynamic analysis have been hotly debated, and that almost all problems can be solved if pronouns are treated as concealed definite descriptions rather than as variables. Strikingly, this is the position illustrate the puzzle, let us consider the sentence John knows that it is raining, which presupposes that it is raining. It is natural to posit that this clause can only be uttered in a context of speech in which it is assumed that it is raining (more formally: each world of the initial Context Set should be one in which it is raining). But this simple-minded analysis makes incorrect predictions for a slightly more complex example, which presupposes nothing at all: It is raining and John knows it. Why is there such a difference between the two examples? Stalnaker, followed by Heim and most contemporary semanticists, suggested that a dynamic view of meaning can solve the problem. The main idea is that the presupposition of the second conjunct is not checked with respect to the initial Context Set C, but rather with respect to an 'intermediate Context Set' C', obtained by updating C with the dynamic meaning of the first conjunct. After this initial update, C' only contains worlds in which it is raining. As a result, the presupposition of John knows it is satisfied with respect to C', though it wasn't with respect to C. The key insight, then, is that the computation of the meaning of a sentence makes reference to a variety of local Context Sets (for short: local contexts), which are obtained as modifications of the initial one.
As seductive as it may be, we will argue that this dynamic turn was misguided. We suggest that the notion of a 'local context' is deceptively appealing in the case of conjunction because the assertion of a conjunction can plausibly be equated with a succession of two assertions (though even this idea is dubious when the conjunction in question is embedded under other operators). But in the case of other connectives, the idea makes little sense. With respect to which context are F and G asserted in the disjunction F or Q? The point of a disjunction is precisely that it does not involve the assertion of either disjunct. How is the dynamic analysis to deal with this case? We believe that it is faced with a dilemma. The pragmatic side of the theory, championed by Stalnaker (e.g. 1974) , must either develop an unintuitive theory of local contexts or forego the extension to other connectives. The semantic side of the theory, developed by Heim, has broader empirical coverage because it can simply stipulate the Context Change Potential of connectives and operators. But for this very reason, it fails to be explanatory: it does not make predictions for connectives whose lexical entry is not stipulated to begin with, and it fails to explain why there couldn't be a deviant conjunction and*, truth-conditionally equivalent to and but with a different projective behavior.
We will propose an alternative account, entirely developed within (static and bivalent) classical logic. We argue that in some cases a complex meaning m is conceptualized as involving a precondition p, with m=pp' (Principle of Division; the notation pp' indicates that a single clause has as its meaning the conjunction of p and p', and that p is the pre-condition of m). When m undergoes Division, a pragmatic principle, Be Articulate!, requires that if possible m should be expressed as a conjunction p and pp' rather than as pp', thus making explicit the separate status of the pre-condition p. If no principle were to rule out the full conjunction, Be Articulate! would prevent pp' from ever being pronounced on its own. However, a principle of Minimization (Minimization of Conjunctions) prohibits any sentence S from starting with α[p and if it can be ascertained that no matter how S will end the string p and could be deleted without modifying its contextual meaning (the intuition is that in such cases p and is semantically idle, and is thus blocked by Gricean considerations: one should not utter words in vain). It is only in case Minimization is violated by the beginning of the full conjunction α [p and p'] that the string α pp' is admissible on its own. This derives a that Heim herself adopted -or at least explored-in Heim 1990 . If the E-type analysis is correct, any account that yields an adequate treatment of definite descriptions will also explain the anaphoric data that originally served to motivate dynamic semantics. We do not discuss anaphora per se in the present paper, and our account of definite descriptions is entirely promissory. principle of Transparency, which suffices to obtain most of Heim's results, but which has the advantage of making predictions about connectives that she does not consider, such as or, unless and while; our principle also rules out a deviant conjunction and* on principled grounds. Towards the end of the paper we speculate (but emphatically do not show) that the Principle of Division can itself be given a pragmatic derivation. It is thus hoped that the present analysis is an intermediate step towards a fully pragmatic account of presuppositions, one whose inspiration goes back to Stalnaker 1974 , Grice 1981 , Abbott 2000 , and Simons 2001.
The Stalnaker/Heim Dilemma
We take the Stalnaker/Heim analysis to have the following logic, which leads straight into a dilemma. 1. Assumption: When a clause pp' with presupposition p is uttered, it requires that p be taken for granted in the context (more properly: Context Set) of utterance .
Observation:
In some cases, the Assumption seems to be violated, e.g. in It is raining and John knows that it is, which does not presuppose anything.
Conclusion:
The notion of 'context' must be ramified. In the course of the evaluation of a sentence, there are a variety of local contexts, which are obtained as modifications of the initial one. In It is raining and John knows that it is, the local context obtained after the first conjunct is evaluated is one in which the presupposition that it is raining is indeed satisfied.
We will argue in what follows that the Observation refutes the Assumption. Instead of claiming that p must be taken for granted in some Context Set, though not necessarily the initial one (as the Conclusion asserts), we will suggest that p must be 'transparent' relative to the one and only Context Set there is, which is the initial one. Those that adopt the Conclusion are led straight into a dilemma. Stalnaker represents its pragmatic horn. For him, a conjunction is a succession of two assertions; by asserting F and G, I perform two successive speech acts: I utter F in a background of assumptions C, and I then utter G in a background of assumptions C', obtained by updating C with F. If we further assume that a clause pp' with presupposition p and assertion p' is felicitous in a context C just in case C entails p (i.e. if each C-world is a p-world), we obtain the following rules, which are formalized by Heim 1983: (1) a. Elementary Clauses C[pp']=# unless each w in C satisfies p.
(C is a Context Set, i.e. a set of possible worlds; pp' is an elementary clause with a presuppositional component p and an assertive component p '; and C[F] is the update of C with F. # indicates an 'error signal' which is obtained when a presupposition failure occurs.) It is immediate that these rules predict that p andshould presuppose nothing at all whenever p entails q -apparently the correct result. Despite this positive result, three negative remarks should be made at the outset.
(i) It is by no means clear that it is a rational strategy, as Stalnaker implies, to update one's beliefs right after one's interlocutor has uttered a sentence or a conjunct. Suppose that my interlocutor is a complete idiot and that I am fully aware of it. A rational strategy might well be not to update my beliefs at all. But certainly this doesn't prevent me from understanding what he has to say. Whatever notion of update is relevant for the analysis of presupposition projection, it is by no means clear that it corresponds to the rules by which a speech act participant modifies his beliefs in the course of a conversation.
(ii) It is also unclear how a conjunction that appears in the scope of other operators could be identified with a succession of two assertions. What should the relevant assertions be in a negative environments such as None of my students is both incompetent and proud of it?
(iii) Finally, it is difficult to see how Stalnaker's strategy can extend to other connectives, such as disjunction. The point of asserting F or G is precisely that one is neither committed to F nor to G. But then how can an analysis based on assertions in some 'local' contexts be made to work in this case?
In order to solve these problems, Heim 1983 adopts the approach pioneered by Stalnaker, but reinterprets it in a semantic fashion. The rule in (1)b is not seen as a rational strategy that a conversation participant should adopt in interpreting what his interlocutor is saying. Rather, the very meaning of the connective and specifies that its effect is to modify the Context Set in such a way that C[F and G]=(C[F]) [G] . Formally, the meaning of a clause is now a function from Context Sets to Context Sets (=a Context Change Potential). To put it in a slogan: meanings should not be viewed as truth conditions, but as Context Change Potentials. This semantic move frees Heim 1983 from the three problems that plagued Stalnaker's approach: she is not forced to equate update rules with rational strategies; she has no special problems with embedded environments since the notion of assertion plays no role in her analysis; and her theory can mechanically extend to other connectives and operators. But the expressive power of her analysis is also its explanatory downfall 3 . Nothing rules out a deviant conjunction and* which has the same truthconditional contribution as and but a different projective behavior. Assume for instance that by definition C[F and* G]=(C[G]) [F] (this is the same rule as before, except that F and G have been permuted in the right-hand side of the identity). This would predict that John knows that it is raining and it is presupposes nothing, while It is raining and John knows that it is presupposes that it is raining. In Stalnaker's theory, this rule makes no sense because the update process does not mirror the chronological order in which the conjuncts are asserted or heard. But in Heim's theory, nothing blocks such an entry, as was observed by Soames 1989. For the same reason, the theory of Heim 1983 makes no predictions -or very weak predictions-about the projective behavior of connectives that she does not consider. The heart of the matter is that the descriptive success of Context Change Potentials stems from the fact that they can encode more information than mere truth conditions; but for this very reason the theory is intrinsically incapable of predicting the projective behavior of connectives and operators from their truth conditions alone.
The Transparency Theory
We will sketch a purely pragmatic alternative to Heim's theory. The main selling point of our analysis is that it derives the projective behavior of connectives from information about their syntax and their (classical) truth-conditional contribution. The theory is predictive precisely because it eschews Context-Change Potentials. It does incorporate a 'dynamic' element, though not in anything like the technical sense of 'dynamic semantics'. Part of the theory depends on the hypothesis that certain pragmatic principles are checked incrementally, as a sentence is pronounced or heard. But unlike Stalnaker's analysis, our theory does not need the assumption that there are 'local' contexts or assertions below the sentence level; nor do we need to posit anything like Context Change Potentials to obtain our results. In fact, we won't even need the assumption that 'Context Sets' are updated at all. In our system, someone who takes his interlocutor to be a fool is at complete liberty to leave his initial Context Set untouched.
Here is how the theory works.
(i) We argue that in some cases a complex meaning m is conceptualized as involving a precondition p, with m=pp' (Principle of Division). p corresponds to what is in standard theories the presupposition, while p' is the assertion. For us, however, p is simply a distinguished conjunct (we don't have any other choice since the logic we adopt is entirely classical, and thus lacks the resources of a third truth value to encode 'presupposition failure'). For most of the discussion Division can be taken to be stipulated in the lexicon, though we will speculate towards the end of the paper that Division is a general pragmatic principle that operates both at and above the word level.
(ii) When a meaning undergoes Division, a pragmatic principle, Be Articulate!, requires that whenever possible it should be expressed as a conjunction p and pp' rather than as pp'. The intuitive idea is that it is sometimes good conversational practice to articulate a pre-condition as a separate conjunct in order to emphasize that it plays a distinguished role. Be Articulate! might itself originate from more basic pragmatic principles, but in this paper we will be content to take it as given, with the following form 4 :
(2) Be Articulate! When (following Division) p is analyzed as a pre-condition of the complex meaning pp', if p and (p)p' can be uttered felicitously in a syntactic context α __ β, α [p and (p) p'] β is preferable to α pp' β.
We have written (p)p' to indicate that the principle comes in two versions. According to Version 1, pp' is in competition with p and pp': John knows that it is raining competes with It is raining and John knows it. According to Version 2, pp' is in competition with p and p': John knows that it is raining may thus compete with something like It is raining and John believes it (the precise nature of p' doesn't matter for our analysis, and it is only for simplicity that we take John knows p to mean p and John believes p 5 ). As far as we can tell, the choice between Version 1 and Version 2 does not matter, as long as it is assumed that in the full conjunction p must come first. This is certainly the only reasonable possibility in Version 1 because the opposite choice (pp' and p) would make p entirely redundant once pp' has been uttered. In fact, it can be checked independently that conjunctions are entirely infelicitous when the second conjunct is entailed by the first one: #John has cancer and is sick is extremely odd; by contrast, John is sick and has cancer is acceptabl; and the same facts hold when we consider sentences with presuppositions: John knows that it is raining and it is is deviant, whereas It is raining and John knows that it is is far more natural. Thus in Version 1 of the theory, the only possible competitor for pp' is p and pp'. In Version 2, by contrast, there is no obvious reason why p and p' rather than p' and p should compete with pp' (in other words, it is unclear why John knows that it is raining should compete with It is raining and John believes it rather than with John believes that it is raining and it is (raining)). This leaves open two possibilities: either we will make slightly different predictions with Version 2 than with Version 1; or we will have to find some independent evidence that the competitor of pp' is p and p', not p' and p.
Be that as it may, the important observation to make at this point is that if no other principle ruled out the full conjunction p and (p)p', we would incorrectly predict that pp' can never be uttered on its own. But a natural principle of Minimization does rule out some conjunctions. The basic idea is that the beginning of a sentence α[p and uttered in a background of assumptions C is infelicitous if no matter what follows this string, the expression p and could be eliminated without modifying the contextual meaning of the result:
If the beginning of a sentence α [p and is uttered in a background of assumptions C, the sentence is infelicitous if it can be ascertained that no matter what the second conjunct p' will be and no matter what the end of the sentence β will be, the string p and could be left out without modifying the contextual meaning of the entire sentence. More precisely, infelicity results if for each possible continuation β,
To illustrate, Minimization of Conjunctions rules out It is raining and __ in a context in which it is assumed that it is raining; and it rules out If it is raining, it is raining and __ in any context whatsoever, since as soon as we hear the word and we can be certain that the entire expression it is raining and was uttered in vain (it could be eliminated without affecting the meaning of the sentence, no matter what the end of the sentence will turn out to be). If Minimization is the only principle that rules out conjunctions, we obtain a characterization of those circumstances in which pp' can be uttered. Given Be Articulate!, [p and pp'] will be preferred to pp' in all cases except when p and is redundant and thus violates Minimization. This occurs just in case the background assumptions C guarantee that: ∀X(α (p and X) β ⇔ α X β). This gives rise to the following principle: [p and pp'] will be preferred to pp' in all cases except when p and is redundant, i.e. exactly in case the background assumptions C guarantee that: ∀X(α (p and X) β ⇔ α X β). Since p and X has the same interpretation as pX, we obtain a Principle of Transparency, which can be stated as follows:
For any initial part α pp' of a sentence uttered in a background of assumptions C, where pp' is a clause that has undergone Division, it should be the case that for any sentence completion β, C|= ∀X(α (p and X) β ⇔ α X β), or equivalently (since p and X and pX have the same meaning): C|= ∀X(α (pX) β ⇔ α X β), where X is a propositional variable.
To illustrate, if it is not assumed that it is raining, It is raining and John knows it is preferred to John knows that it is raining (by Be Articulate!). But if it is assumed that it is raining, It is raining and John knows it violates Minimization, and thus John knows that it is raining become acceptable (for lack of a competitor). By the same reasoning, It is raining and John knows that it is and If it is raining, John knows that it is are acceptable in any context because the would-be competitors are in blatant violation of Minimization: it is clear that the second occurrence of it is raining is redundant in It is raining and it is raining and John knows that it is and in If it is raining, it is raining and John knows that it is.
As the reader may have noticed, this derives simple cases of presupposition projection. Our goal in the following section will be to show that we can match Heim's predictions in almost all the cases she considers, but that we can do so in a predictive way, thanks to an algorithm that extends to connectives that Heim does not consider (as pointed out by an Amsterdam Colloquium referee, our system encounters a difficulty with post-posed if-clauses, which we discuss below). One final remark is in order. As is well-known, all existing theories must make provisions for the contrast between, say, The King of Moldova isn't bald (which normally presuppose that Moldova is a monarchy) and The King of Moldova isn't bald because there is no King of Moldova! (which doesn't presuppose anything). In the latter case, existing theories (in particular Heim 1983) posit a costly mechanism of 'local accommodation', according to which The King of Moldova isn't bald gets interpreted as It is not the case that there is a king of Moldova and that he is bald. Like its competitors, our theory needs a stipulation for this case. We will posit that under duress the process of Division may be foregone, so that pp' is simply analyzed as pp', with no requirement that p satisfy Transparency. This point will matter when we discuss disjunction.
The Projection Problem: Basic Results of the Transparency Theory
We start with an extremely simple syntax for the Object Language.
(5) Syntax of the Object Language
When we discuss the effects of Transparency, we enrich this language with propositional variables and quantifiers, as well as with material implication (⇒) and material equivalence (⇔); we also allow p to be an atom (the additional rules are in bold):
(6) Syntax of the Extended Language
Boolean connectives have their standard semantics, and pp' is interpreted as a simple conjunction (the syntax is intended to indicate that the conjuncts correspond to a single lexical item). The expression if F, G is taken to be a strict indicative conditional: with background assumptions C, if F, G evaluated in any C-world is true if and only if every C-world that satisfies F also satisfies G. The distinguished role of C requires that the modal semantics be relativized both to a world and to a set of worlds. Importantly, it will be enough for our purposes to interpret the universal quantifier to be restricted to the Cworlds. We can thus define the following semantics:
Let W be a domaine of possible worlds and let I be a function from atomic propositions (of the form p or p') to subsets of W. If w∈W, C ⊆W and w∈C: a. If F is atomic (be it of the form p or p'), w, C |= I F iff w∈I(F). b. If F= not G, w, C |= I F iff it is not the case that w, C |= I G. Remark: If the quantifier were not interpreted as restricted to C-worlds, the condition p⊆C would be replaced with p⊆W.
We henceforth write C |=F if for each w∈C, it holds that: w, C |= F.
It is worth noting that when C is fixed, our system reduces, quite simply, a traditional modal logic with universe C (whatever happens outside C is irrelevant for the truth of any formula evaluated within C). In particular, the formula [if G]G' can be seen as a simple notational variant of ❑(G⇒G'). This simplification is only possible because we do not consider subjunctive conditionals, which would require a more complex analysis. It follows from the reduction to modal logic that if two (variable-free) expressions are materially equivalent in each C-world, they are substitutable salva veritate in any formula evaluated with respect to C (this is because two expressions that have the same intension are substitutable salva veritate in a modal logic):
If G and G' are variable-free and if C |= G ⇔ G', then for any formula F which contains G, the result F' of replacing one or several occurrences of G with G' in F satisfies:
Substitutivity will be used repeatedly to derive the results we discuss below.
Connectives I: Standard Cases (not, and, if)
We start by showing step by step that our theory matches Heim's predictions in the simple cases: sentences starting with pp' as well as not (pp') and if pp' all presuppose (at least) p; and sentences starting with p and qq' and if p, qq' (where p is not presuppositional) presuppose if p, q. More general results comparing our system to Heim's in the general case are left for future research.
We consider each case in turn, and we follow the convention that |= is read as |= I .
Example 1. Sentences starting with (pp')
Transparency requires that for any sentence completion β, C |= ∀X ((pX)β ⇔ X β) Claim: Transparency is satisfied iff C |= p. i. If C |=p, for any p⊆C, C |= I[π→p] ((pπ) ⇔ π), hence by Substitutivity C |= I[π→p] ((pπ)β ⇔ π β), and by (restricted) universal quantification C |= ∀X ((pX)β ⇔ X β).
ii. Taking β to be the null string, Transparency requires that C |= ∀X ((pX)⇔X). Therefore in particular C |= I[π→C] ((pπ)⇔π). But π is true in every C-world, and thus C |= I[π→C] p. Since π does not occur in p, we obtain: C |= p. Note: Since the result applies to all sentences starting with (pp'), it applies in particular to sentences starting with (pp') and ..., (pp') or ..., etc.
Example 2. Sentences starting with [not (pp')]
Transparency requires that for any sentence completion β,
Claim: Transparency is satisfied iff C |= p.
i. If C |=p, the result follows as in Example 1. ii. Taking β to be the null string, we have C |= ∀X (not(pX) ⇔ not X), hence C |= ∀X ((pX) ⇔ X), and thus from Example 1, ii: C |= p. 
Example 5. Sentences starting with [if p](qq')
Transparency requires that for all sentence completions β, 
We will come back at the end of this paper to the case of post-posed if-clauses, for which we make incorrect predictions.
Connectives II: Other Cases (or, unless, while)
We now consider more intricate examples, which are not discussed by Heim (though disjunction is discussed by other theories of presupposition projection).
Disjunction
Heim 1983 does not discuss the projective behavior of disjunction. There are a variety of positions in the literature (see Krahmer 1998 , Beaver 2001 . Following Beaver 2001, we take the correct result to be that pp' or q presupposes that p, and p or qq' presupposes that if not p, q. Whatever their stand is on this issue, existing theories must stipulate the projective behavior of or, which never follows from anything else. One could attempt (as Beaver does) to claim that F or G must be defined as if not F, G. But of course the fact that that this definition is correct when one considers truth conditions alone (as in propositional logic) does not entail that it must also hold within a semantics based on Context Change Potentials, since the latter is strictly more expressive than the former. Thus it could well be that F or G and if not F, G have the same truth-conditions, but different Context Change Potentials. In fact, this is precisely the situation we described at the beginning of this paper when we compared F and G to F and* G. Without the assumption of inter-definability, Beaver 2001 must do as everyone else, and stipulate the behavior of disjunctions.
Contrary to existing proposals, our algorithm makes precise predictions: as already shown in Example 1, pp' or q presupposes p (since the sentence starts with pp'); and we will now show that p or qq' presupposes if not p, q.
Example 6. Sentences starting with [p or (qq')].
Transparency requires that for any sentence completion β, 
e. C |= ((not p) ⇒ q).
Are these predictions correct? The following example is correctly predicted to presuppose nothing: (9) This house has no bathroom or the bathroom is in a funny place (after Partee) So far, so good. But it would seem that we make incorrect predictions when the disjuncts are reversed:
(10) The bathroom is in a funny place or this house has no bathroom Arguably (10) (which is also a standard example) can be understood as presupposing nothing, which does not square well with the claim that (pp' or q) presupposes that p.
Although we will not give a full solution to this problem, we make two preliminary remarks.
1. As pointed out by B. Spector (p.c.) , there are other cases that suggest that there is a weak but systematic asymmetry in the projective behavior of disjunctions, as illustrated by the contrast between (11)a-b:
(11) a. John doesn't have a violin or his instrument is well hidden.
b. John's instrument is well hidden or he doesn't have a violin. (B. Spector).
(11)a doesn't presuppose anything, as is predicted by the analysis of Example 6. If or were projectively symmetric, (11)b should presuppose nothing either. But as B. Spector points out, this is empirically dubious (on the other hand the contrast appears to disappear when have is stressed and violin is destressed in the second clause, as was pointed out by D. Büring; we have no account of this fact). Why should Spector's contrast hold? Remember that our theory allows for Division not to be applied, though this should be a costly option, to which an interpreter can resort only in case the normal interpretive process leads to an absurdity (as was mentioned, this is our version of what other theories call 'local accommodation'). Let us now consider what will happen in (10) if Division is applied in the first conjunct. After Transparency is checked, it will have to be assumed that the house has a bathroom. But then the second disjunct will be trivially false, and thus eliminable. General principles of minimization should then require that it not be uttered, which leads to a pragmatic absurdity. At this point one has no choice but to forego Division, which yields the impression that the sentence does not presuppose anything. But let us now apply the same reasoning to (11)b. Suppose that we do in fact generate the presupposition that John has an instrument. There is still a possibility that he does or doesn't have a violin, and thus the second disjunct is not idle as it was in the first case. No pragmatic absurdity arises, and thus there is no reason to forego Division. After Transparency is checked in the first disjunct (following the logic of Example 1), we obtain a presupposition that John has a musical instrument.
2. It should be added that if -in spite of Spector's observation-one were to argue from (10) that or is projectively symmetric, one would also be forced to revisit the projective behavior of other connectives. For instance it is normally thought that if pp', q presupposes p but that if p, qq' only presupposes if p, q. However (10) can be modified to suggest that in some cases if pp', q only presupposes that if not q, p:
(12) a. <> If this house has a bathroom, the bathroom is in a weird place.
b. <> If the bathroom is not in a weird place, this house has no bathroom.
Of course when the (costly) option of local accommodation is taken into account, these examples appear less surprising. If the usual mechanism of presupposition generation and projection were applied in the antecedent of (12)b, we would obtain a global presupposition that there is a bathroom, and the indicative conditional would become pragmatically odd: it would require that there be a possibility that the house has no bathroom even though it is presupposed that it has one. Local accommodation (or in our terms failure of Division) would seem to be the only way to save the sentence. The crucial question is whether the situation is really different when one considers examples in which local accommodation is not forced in this way:
(13) a. <> If John has a violin, his instrument is hidden in a weird place. b. <> If John's instrument is not hidden in a weird place, he has no violin.
The present line of analysis would predict that (13)a presupposes nothing, and that (13)b presupposes that John has an instrument (since no pragmatic absurdity arises in this case: all the indicative conditional requires is that there be a possibility that John has an instrument, that the instrument in question is not hidden, and that John has no violin). I must say, however, that I find the contrast between a. and b. less clear in (13) than in (11). We leave a more thorough discussion of this issue for future research.
Other Connectives: unless and while
Heim 1983 makes no predictions about other connectives that she does not consider, such as unless or while. But the present analysis is more constrained. From the equivalence between Unless F, G and Unless F, [not F] and G, we predict that any presupposition of G entailed by not F should automatically be transparent. This prediction is borne out in (14): (14) Unless John didn't come, Mary will know that he is here
Intuitively (14) (16) a. <> Before John became a politician, his mother was glad that he had a normal job.
b. <> After John became a politician, his mother was worried that he didn't have a normal job.
If in a context C the speech act participants assume that John is a politician is true if and only if John does not have a normal job, we predict that in C both sentences should be acceptable, thanks to the following intuitive equivalences:
(17) a. Before John became a politician, G ⇔ Before John became a politician, John wasn't a politician and G b. After John became a politician, G ⇔ After John became a politician, John was a politician and G
In each case, the right-hand side of the equivalence guarantees that in C the presupposition of the main clause will be transparent, which accounts for the acceptability of both examples.
Extension: Quantifiers (Simple Cases)
Presupposition projection in quantified structures is a notoriously hairy topic, which we only treat superficially by
considering [every P](QQ'), [at least one P](QQ') and [no P](QQ').
Without defining a full formal system, we extend out notation from propositional to predicate constants and variables: the underlined part is the presuppositional one, and concatenation is interpreted as generalized conjunction. In all three cases Heim 1983 predicts the same presupposition, namely that every P-individual satisfies Q. For better or worse, we match her results.
We assume in the following that the domain of individuals, D, is fixed across possible worlds. ii. If some P-individual, say i, is not a Q-individual in a C-world w, Transparency fails. Let us take β to be the null string. Then: C |= I[∂→{i}] [At least one P]∂, but C |≠ I[∂→{i}] [At least one P](Q∂) (because i, the only individual that satisfies ∂ in w, satisfies P but not Q). Although the predictions might be correct for at least one, they are probably too strong for indefinites, e.g. A fat man was pushing his bicycle, which doesn't presuppose that every fat man in the domain of discourse owns a bicycle. We come back to this problem at the end of this paper.
Example 9. Sentences starting with [No P] (QQ')
Transparency is satisfied (the argument is the same as in Example 8 and Example 9). ii. If some P-individual, say i, is not a Q-individual in a C-world w, Transparency fails. Let us take β to be the null string. Then: w, C |= I[∂→{i}] [No P](Q∂) (because i does not satisfy Q in w, which entails that no individual can satisfy both ∂ and Q in w). But w, C |≠ I[∂→{i}] [No P]∂ since i satisfies both P and ∂ in w.
The Triggering Problem: Against a Lexical Treatment
The theory developed in the preceding sections is logically compatible with a lexicalist account of the Triggering Problem. Although our framework departs from standard analyses of the Projection Problem, it wouldn't be incoherent to state that Division is lexically encoded, and that a presuppositional expression e appears in the lexicon as pp', which specifies that e should compete with [p and (p) p'] (and thus that p must obey Transparency). This hypothesis raises an unsettling question, however: why should such lexical entries exist in the first place? We will circumvent this problem by suggesting (speculatively) that Division is not lexically encoded, but results from a pragmatic desire to utter as a separate conjunct a part p of a complex meaning m, with m=pp'. This idea was already explored by Stalnaker 1974 , Grice 1981 and Abbott 2000 , but a proper definition of 'complex' and of 'precondition' (which are crucial to turn the intuition into a theory) is left for future research.
In this short section, we concentrate on two arguments against a lexical treatment. The first one is that presupposition-like phenomena can be triggered at the compositional level, with adverbial modification; this was already discussed by Simons 2001 . It is plausible that a pragmatic account is needed for these cases; but if so, conceptual economy suggests that the same account might apply at the lexical level as well. The second argument stems from pragmatic constraints on the triggering process. We argue that presuppositions fail to be triggered when the putative assertion is 'too dependent' on the presupposition, so that the latter cannot be seen as an autonomous condition for the former (because the full meaning m and its putative pre-condition p are too entwined, so to speak). If this sketch could be made into a theory, the same pragmatic principle would account for the Triggering Problem and for the Projection Problem -a desirable (if promissory) result.
Presupposition-like effects with adverbials
Consider the following data, both in English and in French (the French version allows for an additional control, discussed below; we use => for: intuitively implies):
(18) a. Jean n'est pas arrivé en retard.
John didn't arrive late => Jean arrived. a'. John didn't come late. => John came b. Aucun de ces étudiants n'est arrivé en retard. None of these students arrived late => Some of these students arrived (strong implication) => Each of these students arrived (possibly, weaker implication) b'. None of these students came late. => Some of these students came (strong implication) => Each of these students came (possibly, weaker implication)
To my ear, (18)a carries a strong implication that Jean came; (18)b carries a strong implication that some student came; but it also carries a somewhat weaker implication that each student came. The facts in (18)a are unsurprising: it is likely that <Jean came, Jean came late> forms a Gricean scale in this context (because one could certainly have decided not to utter late) 7 . John didn't come is more informative than John didn't come late; as a result, the less informative member of the pair implicates that the more informative member is false, and thus that John did come. Applied to (18)b, the same reasoning predicts that None of these students came late should implicate that it is false that none of these students came, and hence that some of these students came. But this doesn't suffice to derive the second (possibly weaker) implication that each of these students came. The latter behaves very much as a presupposition rather than as a scalar implicature: None of these students knows that he'll be unemployed doesn't just imply that some of these students will be unemployed, but all of them will be 8 . We conclude, following Simons 2001 , that adverbial modification can trigger presupposition-like phenomena.
Why should that be? One could argue that adverbials are quite generally presupposition triggers, though it is a bit unclear how this theory could be implemented and motivated; it would also fail to account for the observation that the presuppositional effect we get is a bit weaker than with 'standard' presuppositions. An alternative is that a presupposition-like phenomenon is generated by Be Articulate!: x came late can be viewed semantically as a conjunction of two conditions: (i) x came, and (ii) x did so late. If the former can be seen as a pre-condition of the latter, Be Articulate! would require that one should utter (i) and (ii) as separate conjuncts, for instance as x arrived, and was late. Only in case the full conjunction is disallowed by the minimization principle can x came late be uttered felicitously. But this means that x came should behave as a presupposition of x came late. There is a catch, however. Unlike the cases we discussed earlier, the expression x came late is somewhat articulated, since it involves two expressions (came + late) rather than just one, as in the case of know. This should lead us to expect that the presuppositional effect should be slightly weaker than in standard presuppositions, as appears to be the case.
This line of analysis suggests that the presuppositional effect should be strengthened if the same meaning is conveyed with a single word, and that it should be weakened if it is expressed with a more explicit form of modification. I believe that these effects are indeed found (I provide both French and English examples for the first part; I have only tested the second part in French):
(19) Strengthening the presuppositional effect a. Aucun de ces étudiants n'a été en retard. None of these students was late => Each of these students came. b. None of these students was late. => Each of these students came. 8 An alternative possibility, which should be explored in future research, is that the standard account of scalar implicatures is incorrect. This has indeed been argued on independent grounds by Chierchia 2004 , Sauerland 2004 , Spector 2003 . It is thus particularly important to have theory-neutral tests to determine whether the inference triggered by adverbial modification can or cannot be handled as a scalar implicature. One could try to compare the effect obtained with the implicature triggered by the scale <or, and> in the scope of the same quantifier none of these students:
(i) None of these students read (both) Chomsky and Montague It is clear that (i) suggests that some of these students read Chomsky and Montague, as the standard neo-Gricean account suggests (because it is implicated that the more informative alternative None of these students read Chomsky or Montague is false, hence the result). The question is whether something stronger is also implied, namely that each of these students read Chomsky or Montague. We leave this question for future research.
(20) Weakening the presuppositional effect (French) Aucun de ces étudiants n'est arrivé en étant en retard. None of these students arrived while being late => Some of these students arrived. ≠> Each of these students arrived
The Role of Independence
Why should it sometimes be better conversational practice to articulate a condition as a separate conjunct? We do not have anything like a full answer to offer. But there appear to be general conditions under which a presupposition is not generated. In particular, when a putative condition cannot be taken as separate from the intended meaning because it pragmatically entails it, no presupposition is triggered. By 'pragmatically entail', we mean that in typical situations, if the condition holds, then the entire proposition is true as well, though this need not be an entailment in the logical sense (not even a contextual entailment, i.e. an entailment relative to the assumptions of the conversation). Let us now briefly illustrate this observation. The sentence in (21) gives rise to a pragmatic ambiguity: it may be understood with the presupposition that the statement is true, or without it (in the latter case the sentence means something like: If this statement is true and my brother comes to think so, he will act accordingly). However it seems to us that the non-presuppositional reading is much easier to obtain in Situation 2 than in Situation 1. Why should that be? Intuitively the reason is that in Situation 2 one might well expect that if the statement is true my brother will come to think so precisely because he is an excellent mathematician. In other words, this statement is true pragmatically entails my brother will learn that this statement is true. As a result, the former cannot be considered as a pre-condition of the latter, and no presupposition is generated. In Situation 1, by contrast, there is no expectation that if the statement is true my 10-year-old brother will learn about it. A similar contrast can be seen with discover in the following example:
(22) George hasn't announced that dinner is ready. a. Situation 1: George is the family butler, who is entirely reliable. The sentence is uttered by the mother to her ten-year old son, who is rushing to the dinner table. b. Situation 2: George is a newly-hired employee at the information desk of a hotel. The sentence is uttered by his boss, who is thinking of firing him.
Here too we find a pragmatic ambiguity: the sentence may or may not presuppose that dinner is ready. In the latter case, it has roughly the meaning It is not the case that dinner is ready and that George has said so. Importantly, the non-presuppositional reading is much more readily available in Situation 1 than it is in Situation 2. Why? Again we wish to suggest that this is because in Situation 1 one expects that as soon as dinner is ready George should say that this is so; while in Situation 2 there is no such presumption because George is a newlyhired employee, who has not built a reputation of reliability. As a result, George announced that dinner is ready can be taken to have as a pre-condition that dinner is ready in Situation 2 but not in Situation 1 .
Problems and Prospects
We conclude with a list of open problems, with possible directions for future research. The first four problems are ones that we inherit from Heim 1983, precisely because we follow her in almost all her predictions (see van der Sandt 1993 and Geurts 1999 for a critique of Heim's theory). The last two problems are artifacts of the present implementation, and will have to be considered in detail in future research.
1. Some of the predictions made for quantified statements by Heim 1983 and the present appear to be too strong. Consider indefinites: One of my students knows that he will be unemployed doesn't presuppose that each of my students will be unemployed. The universal presupposition might well be easier to obtain with modified numerals than with standard indefinites: At least one of my students knows that he will be unemployed is more readily understood with a very strong presupposition. It is thus conceivable that our predictions are incorrect for standard indefinites due to an independent difference between those and modified numerals.
A natural suggestion is that the unexpected projective behavior of indefinites is related to their -equally unexpected-ability to 'scope out' of syntactic islands, as in If some relative of mine dies, I'll inherit a house. One way to solve the latter problem (due in particular to Schwarzschild 2002) is to assume that for some reason indefinites differ from modified numerals in being able to have an implicit domain restriction with, combined with the overt restrictor, holds true of one individual only. The wide scope effect can in this way be analyzed as a semantic illusion; the sentence is treated as If some relative of mine satisfying D dies, I'll inherit a house, where D is a domain restriction whose extension is small enough that only one individual is a relative satisfying D (in more sophisticated versions of the theory it could be postulated that the domain variable D can be existentially quantified, which introduces further complexities in the analysis). Importantly, this line of analysis can also account for the surprisingly weak projective behavior of indefinites. Consider the sentence Some relative of mine knows that he'll inherit a house, analyzed as Some relative of mine satisfying D knows that he'll inherit a house. What our theory -or Heim's-predicts is that it is presupposed that each of my relatives who satisfy D will inherit a house. But if D holds of a small number of individuals, we will get the impression that the presupposition is not universal -just as is desired.
2. We have been entirely silent about the projective behavior of restrictors. The facts are not particularly clear, but there seem to be minimal differences that are hard to capture for a purely pragmatic approach. To my ear, there is a fairly sharp contrast between No student who knows that he is incompetent applied vs. No student who applied knows that he is incompetent: the first sentence presupposes nothing or something very weak, while the second sentence presupposes that each of the students who applied is incompetent. We could try to account for the difference by positing that implicit domain restrictions on quantifiers are fixed incrementally so as to satisfy Transparency whenever possible. This would have the effect that the first sentence gets analyzed as No student who satisfies D and who knows that he is incompetent applied, where D is chosen to hold of a subset of the students who are incompetent, in such a way that Transparency is automatically satisfied. By contrast, in the second sentence the implicit domain restriction has already been fixed when the nuclear scope knows that he is incompetent is processed, with the result that a stronger presupposition is obtained. Obviously more work is needed to determine what the full range of facts is, and whether the analysis we sketched can be made to work.
3. Heim's theory has been criticized by van der Sandt 1993 and Geurts 1999 on the ground that it predicts presuppositions that are often too weak:
(23) a. If the problem was easy/difficult, it isn't John who solved it. (Geurts 1999) b. Peter knows that if the problem was easy/difficult, someone solved it. (Geurts 1999) Heim's theory, followed by ours, predicts that (23)a should presuppose that if the problem was easy/difficult, someone solved it, and that it should be presuppositionally indistinguishable from (23)b. But the facts are very different in the two cases: the predicted presupposition appears to be correct for (23)b, but not for (23)a, which out of the blue has the presupposition that someone solved the problem. However the data change when (23)a is preceded by a sentence that asserts the proposition which, according to Heim and to us, is in fact presupposed:
(24) If the problem was easy/difficult, someone solved it. But if so, it isn't John who solved it.
Van der Sandt 1993 and Geurts 1999 take these facts to argue for their 'anaphoric' theory of presuppositions. Within our framework an additional mechanism is needed to derive the stronger-thanexpected presupposition of (23)a. In a nutshell, we believe that the problem might be solved by allowing Transparency to be checked in a 'lazy' fashion, according to which one does not consider the entire syntactic environment in which the presuppositional element appears to check for Transparency; rather, a lazy interpreter will adapt the set of assumptions C so as to ensure that the contextual meaning of a constituent satisfies Transparency no matter which syntactic environment it is embedded in (as B. Spector noted (p.c.), a similar measure could be adopted just as well to save Heim's theory from van der Sandt's and Geurts's objections). To be concrete, one may elect to satisfy Transparency lazily by ensuring that in the background C the contextual meaning of it isn't John who solved the problem, analyzed as pp' [with p=someone solved the problem and p'=John solved the problem], is equivalent to p'. This will turn out to require that C |= ∀X (pX ⇔ X), and hence that C |= p, as is desired. But of course the repercussions of Laziness have yet to be explored. 4. We also inherit systematic problems with respect to the projective behavior of attitude verbs 9 . John believes that he is sick and he wants Mary to know that he is doesn't presuppose that John wants to be sick, contrary to what a straightforward application of our theory might lead us to expect (if John wants F is analyzed as meaning something like: F holds in each of John's bouletic alternatives; as in other quantified examples, our analysis predicts a presupposition that each of John's bouletic alternatives satisfies the presupposition of F). This problem has been discussed in some detail by Heim 1992, but it is quite general. The line adopted in Heim 1992 is to analyze want in terms of belief. Roughly, John wants F is taken to mean something like John believes that if F, things are better for him than if not F. This analysis could be adapted to the present theory, but it would need to receive some independent motivation. 5. It was been pointed out by an Amsterdam Colloquium reviewer that post-posed if-clauses might well have the same projective behavior as pre-posed ones:
Ok If there is a reviewer, the reviewer is mad, Ok The reviewer is mad, if there is a reviewer. But as was noted in earlier examples, more complex sentences must be considered to determine what the precise nature of the problem. The foregoing sentences might well be treated in terms of local accommodation, since it would make no pragmatic sense to say if there is a reviewer unless one assumes that there might be no reviewer. Let us thus go back to Spector's example: If John has a violin, his instrument is well hidden. Do the facts change when the if-clause is post-posed, as in: John's instrument is well hidden, if he has a violin? If the facts do not change, our theory has a serious problem, and we will have to change some of our assumptions; if the modified sentence does presuppose that John has an instrument, we can leave the theory as it is. We would tend to go for the first solution but must confess that we are unsure of the data 10 .
6. At this point we do not have a worked out account of the presuppositions triggered by definite descriptions. But here is a direction we would like to explore: a. A definite description the F is of the individual type (type e), and denotes the non-existent object # (which encodes referential failure) unless there is exactly one F-individual.
b. # does not lie in the extension of any atomic predicate (not even identity). Since the logic is bivalent, [the F]P is trivially false unless there is exactly one F-individual. In this way we derive Russellian truth-conditions (even though [the F] is not quantificational).
c. For reasons to be investigated (maybe following the discussion in Grice 1981), Division occurs in [the F]P, which gets analyzed as qq', with q=there is exactly one F-individual, and q'=some (or all) F-individuals are P. When q is required to satisfy Transparency, we obtain the expected presuppositional behavior of definite descriptions.
d. We assume that two pragmatic violations are obtained when the expected presupposition is not satisfied: one is simply the violation of Transparency; and an additional deviance might be obtained because the non-existent object # was allowed to play a role in the truth conditions. This might yield stronger violations than with other presupposition triggers.
